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CHAPTER 17 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE and GEORGE E. DONOVAN 
A. GENERAL INSURANCE - COURT DECISIONS 
§17.I. Insurance agents: Agency contract. In White v. Universal 
Underwriters Insurance CO.l an agent sought an accounting under an 
insurance agency contract terminated by mutual agreement of the 
parties. A number of questions were raised concerning "contingent 
commissions," "expirations ownership," and "accounting dates." In 
remanding the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings, 
the Supreme Judicial Court held that when an accounting is made 
under a contingent commission agreement at a date after the account-
ing date fixed by the agreement, any loss experience data or modifica-
tions in reserve estimates which become available subsequent to the 
accounting date must be used in making the accounting. Moreover, 
the Court directed that upon remand the defendant insurer should 
have the opportunity to update the experience figures, so that the 
accounting would reBect the most recently available data. It dismissed 
the possibility that this rule would unreasonably invite nonperform-
ance by a party who might anticipate that upon an accounting based 
upon estimated reserves he would owe a substantial balance, suggesting 
that in such a case the obligation should be treated as liquidated as 
of the date the account should have been stated, with interest payable 
from that date. The Court further held that physical damage policies 
written for terms that did not coincide with the calendar year and 
which had been reinsured by the defendant as of the termination date 
of the agency contract were, as between the parties, closed business to 
be treated for purposes of fixing the accounting date as policies which 
"shall have been terminated by expiration or cancellation." In 
awarding the plaintiff damages for the wrongful appropriation of his 
expirations, the Court found nothing inconsistent in the agency agree-
ment that gave to the insurer, for the purposes of policy service and 
premium collection, possession of the expiration records of all policies 
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with premiums unpaid thirty days after termination of the agreement, 
but preserved the exclusive rights of the plaintiff to such records for 
any policy on which the premiums had been fully paid within ninety 
days of the termination date. 
§17.2. Motor vehicle insurance: Definition of insured. The 
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Safeguard Insurance CO.1 was a bill for a 
declaratory judgment to determine liability under two policies, a 
general liability policy issued by Travelers and a motor vehicle 
liability policy issued by Safeguard. An employee of the food store 
insured under the Travelers policy had deposited two bags of groceries 
in the automobile of one of the store's customers and had then pulled 
the automobile door to close it, catching and severely injuring the fin-
gers of the customer. Safeguard had issued its policy insuring the 
customer's automobile. The trial judge ruled that Safeguard had no 
obligation to pay for the injuries sustained, and that Travelers was 
bound to assume the defense of the store in an action by the injured 
customer to recover for his in juries. From this ruling Travelers 
appealed, arguing that any liability to its customer imposed on the 
store would be on the theory of respondeat superior, that in this 
event the store would have an action against the employee for re-
imbursement, and that in this action Safeguard would be obliged to 
defend the employee under the policy issued by it to the customer. 
Under the motor vehicle liability policy, Safeguard was bound to 
"pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury 
. . . sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle." The policy 
defined "insured" to include "any person while using the motor 
vehicle and any person or organization legally responsible for the use 
thereof, provided the actual use of the motor vehicle is ... with the 
permission of" the named insured or his spouse. The Court found 
that the store owner's employee was not an insured under these pro-
visions, holding that if what the employee did in this case was a "use" 
of the automobile, it was too casual and too remote from the operation 
of the motor vehicle to qualify him as an "insured." In many cases 
it has been held that loading or unloading a motor vehicle is a use 
or operation thereof.2 In these cases, however, the motor vehicle was 
typically a commercial vehicle, usually being used at the time of the 
injury in the regular course of soliciting trade or delivering merchan-
dise. In the present case there was no evidence that the motor 
vehicle was involved in any such use, so as to bring the insured's 
employee within the coverage of the Safeguard policy. 
§17.3. Motor vehicle insurance: Nonowned automobiles. In 
MacLellan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO.1 the plaintiff executor 
§17.2. 1346 Mass. 622, 195 N.E.2d 86 (1964). 
2See Nichols &: Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 343 Mass. 494, 179 N.E.2d 593 
(1962), 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.6. 
§17.3. 1346 Mass. 415, 193 N.E.2d 577 (1963). 
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sought to reach and apply the proceeds of an insurance policy written 
by the defendant insurer in satisfaction of a judgment obtained by him 
against one Walter G. Bruce for the death of Barbara A. MacLellan 
in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident Bruce, an 
employee of the Trustees for County Aid to Agriculture, was driving 
his own automobile in the trustees' business. The policy in suit 
was issued by Liberty Mutual to the trustees, and afforded coverage 
only for the use by persons other than the named insured in the named 
insured's business of automobiles neither owned nor hired by the 
named insured. By its terms the policy covered the liability only of 
the named insured and of any executive officer of the named insured. 
Bruce was not an executive officer and therefore could not be brought 
within the insuring agreements. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected 
the argument that Bruce was brought within the terms of the policy 
as an insured person by the declarations entry designating the number 
of "Class 1" persons as ten, of whom Bruce was admitt.edly one, observ-
ing that this entry merely described the hazard insured and could not 
be construed as enlarging the policy definition of insured. 
§17.4. Motor vehicle insurance: Uninsured motorists coverage. 
The plaintiff in Fazio v. The Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.1 
sought to recover, under the "protection against uninsured motorists" 
coverage2 of a Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Liability Policy issued by 
the defendant insurer, for bodily injury, which she alleged she sus-
tained when her automobile was sideswiped by a hit-and-run auto-
mobile. The insurer denied liability, and the plaintiff filed a demand 
for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. In its 
answer to this demand the insurer stated that "[A]ll coverage questions 
which are in controversy, including but not limited to the question of 
whether a hit-and-run motor vehicle was involved in the alleged acci-
dent, are not the subject matter of arbitration and the insurer expressly 
reserves and does not waive its right to set up as a defense any and all 
coverage defenses which it has to this claim." Following arbitration 
proceedings properly conducted, the arbitrator made an award in 
which the plaintiff's claim was "denied in its entirety." The defend-
ant insurer appealed an order of the Superior Court granting the 
plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. 
The plaintiff's motion to vacate was based upon supposed defects 
apparent upon the face of the award, namely, (1) that the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority, and (2) tha~ the reasons for denying her claim 
cannot be determined from the award. The matters which were to be 
decided by arbitration, in accordance with the policy insuring agree-
ment, were limited to the fault of the hit-and-run motorist and the 
damages to which the claimant was entitled.8 While the rather inept 
§17.4. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 529, 197 N.E.2d 598. 
2 Uninsured motorists coverage, so-called, was authorized in Massachusetts by Acts 
of 1959, c. 438. See discussion of this enactment in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.8. 
8 The "Arbitration" Condition of the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Policy provides 
as follows: "ARBITRATION if any person making claim hereunder and the com-
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language of the award, denying the plaintiff's claim "in its entirety" 
seems to encompass a finding with regard to the liability of the insurer 
and, further, seems to resolve questions of coverage which the parties 
had agreed were not subject to arbitration, the Supreme Judicial 
Court interpreted it as meaning no more than that the plaintiff was 
awarded nothing. The Court, confirming the arbitrator's award, 
pointed out that while evidence could have been introduced to show 
that the arbitrator's findings exceeded the scope of the agreement, none 
had been offered, and that in these circumstances it is the legal pre-
sumption that arbitrators pursue the submission, deciding only the 
matters contained in it, and also that they decide all matters submitted 
to them.4 As to the second ground for plaintiff's motion to vacate, 
the Court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to any statement of 
reasons. The only requirement of the arbitration condition is that 
the award be in writing and carry the signature of the arbitrator. 
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law upon which the award 
is based need not be given.5 
§17.5. Fire insurance: Subrogation. Eastern Restaurant Equip-
ment Co. v. Tecci1 was an action brought for the benefit of the plain-
tiff's fire insurer, who sought to be subrogated to the plaintiff's claim 
against the defendant under a conditional sale contract and a promis-
sory note for the purchase and installation of certain restaurant equip-
ment supplied by the plaintiff. Under the terms of the contract, the 
risk of loss of the equipment and the obligation to insure were imposed 
upon the conditional vendee, but the conditional vendor was author-
ized to insure the equipment for the benefit of the vendor and his 
assigns at the expense of the vendee and to charge the cost of the 
insurance to the vendee. The contract further provided that the de-
struction of the equipment would not relieve the vendee from liability 
for the full purchase price. The vendee neglected to obtain insurance, 
despite his contractual obligation. However, the equipment was 
automatically insured under a blanket policy maintained by the 
vendor, which covered goods that any purchaser failed to insure in an 
amount equal to the unpaid balance of his account at the time of loss. 
Following assignment of the vendee's note to a finance company and 
pany do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from 
the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the 
insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment which may be owing under 
this coverage, then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon 
which such person and the company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment 
upon the award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof. Such person and the company each agree to consider itself 
bound and to be bound by any award made by the arbitrators pusuant to this 
coverage." 
4 Sperry v. Ricker, 4 Allen 17, 19-20 (Mass. 1862). 
5 Leominster v. Fitchburg & Worcester R.R., 7 Allen 38 (Mass. 1863). For a 
collection of cases see Annotation, 82 A.L.R.2d 969, 971 (1962). 
§17.5. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 196 N.E.2d 869. 
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partial payment by the vendee, the equipment was completely de-
stroyed by fire and the vendor's insurer paid the assignee the full 
amount of the unpaid balance less the unearned interest. At no time 
did the vendor seek to charge the vendee with the cost of insurance. 
It is now generally held that insurance of a vendor's interest under 
a conditional sale contract is closely similar to insurance of a mortga-
gee's interest in mortgaged property. In the early Massachusetts case 
of King v. State Mutual Fire Insurance CO.,2 the Supreme Judicial 
Court, emphasizing the personal character of the policy of insurance, 
refused to allow the insurer of the mortgagee to succeed by subrogation 
to his rights against the mortgagor, thus allowing the mortgagee to 
enforce both of his contract rights, one against the insurer and one 
against the mortgagor. The effect of that decision has been overcome, 
however, when the mortgagee has agreed that the insurer shall be 
subrogated as required by the provision of the standard fire policy.s 
In the present case the conditional vendor's policy was not in the 
record, and there was no showing that it contained a subrogation 
provision. 
The case is one that closely resembles an exception to the King v. 
State Mutual rule set down by Chief Justice Shaw, applicable to the 
case in which the mortgagee may under the mortgage agreement cause 
the property to be insured at the expense of the mortgagor. In those 
circumstances the insurance is treated as collateral security furnished 
by the debtor, and in the event of loss the insurance proceeds extin-
guish the debt pro tanto. In the view of the Court, this rule should 
also apply to conditional vendors and should apply if the premium for 
the vendor's policy is chargeable to the vendee, thus forestalling the 
possibility of allowing the vendor to decide not to charge the premium 
to the vendee after a loss has occurred, thereby preventing the vendee 
from receiving the benefit of the insurance. In giving the vendee 
the benefit of the vendor's insurance, the Court specifically noted 
that the result is consistent with the recent holding of the federal 
district court in In re Future Manufacturing Cooperative, Inc.,' 
but eschewed the broad general grounds of that decision, which in-
volved a policy containing a subrogation clause. Presumably, the 
result in the Tecci case would have been different if there had been 
a showing that the policy required subrogation of the insurer to the 
vendor's rights against the vendee. 
§17.6. Railroad blanket bond: Fidelity of employees. In Boston 
& Maine R.R. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety CO.1 the railroad sought 
to recover under an employees blanket bond which obligated the 
defendant insurer to indemnify it "against any loss ... for which the 
27 Cush. 1 (Mass. 1851). 
8G.L., c. 175, §99; Canton Cooperative Bank v. American Century Ins. Co., 219 
Mass. 1!12, 106 N.E. 6!15 (1914); Allen v. Insurance Co., 1!12 Mass. 480 (1882). 
, 165 F. Supp. 111, 116 (N.D. Calif. 1958). 
§17.6. 1222 F. Supp. 458 (D. Mass. 196!1), aU'd, !l29 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1964). 
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Insured is legally liable ... through Culpable Negligence as defined 
... on the part of anyone or more of the Employees .... " Culpable 
negligence is defined in the bond to mean "only gross carelessness in 
the performance or omission of duties, or the deliberate assumption of 
risk by an Employee in violation of printed or written instructions, 
rules or regulations of the Insured. . .." Loss was sustained by the 
railroad following a freight agent's release of shipments to a consignee 
on order-notify bills of lading at a time when the aggregate value of 
shipments not paid for exceeded the limit specified in a delivery 
bond that had been posted by the consignee. The shipments were 
released by the freight agent at the direction of the railroad's regional 
sales manager, who informed him that the president of the railroad 
had directed release of the shipments to the consignee. 
At the trial before the District Court for Massachusetts, the judge, 
sitting without a jury, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the 
employee's authority to exercise credit supervision over the consignee 
had been abrogated by the railroad's regional sales manager when he 
instructed the employee to release the shipments, with the result that 
the employee could not thereafter be negligent in supervising the 
credit status of the consignee'S account so as to bring his actions within 
the coverage of the blanket bond. On appeal the circuit court relied 
upon the langiIage of the bond and affirmed the judgment for the in-
surer on the ground that the employee, in following the instructions 
of the regional sales manager, who had asserted that he was under in-
structions from the company president, could not be said to be guilty 
of "gross carelessness" or "deliberate assumption of risk in violation 
of printed or written instructions." 
The court observed that "gross carelessness" is undefined in Massa-
chusetts case law, but that gross negligence is a well-established legal 
concept. Although the terms are not synonymous, gross carelessness 
goes as far as gross negligence in regards to the degree of departure 
from the standard of reasonable care. It implies an indifference to 
consequences, a disregard of the cautions that would prevent a reason-
able man from taking a specific course of action. The release of the 
shipments in this case was a breach of contract between the railroad 
and the shippers; it left the railroad without the protection of the 
delivery bond, but it was not the consequence of the freight agent's 
gross carelessness. He did only what he was ordered to do by superiors 
presumably authorized to give such orders. 
§17.7. Medical service corporation: Subscribers' rates. In Rose 
v. Board of Review in the Division of Insurance,l the plaintiff, a 
participating physician under contract with the defendant Massachu-
setts Medical Service, Inc. (Blue Shield), sought a review as an ag-
grieved party2 in the Superior Court of a decision by the defendant 
§17.7. 1346 Mass. 581, 195 N.E.2d 82 (1964). 
2 G.L., c. 176B, §12, provides in part as follows: "Any dispute or controversy 
arising between a medical service corporation and any participating physician ... 
may ... be submitted by any person aggrieved to a board serving in the division 
6
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Board of Review in a dispute over the physician's right to a fee for 
services in excess of that fixed by the Blue Shield fee schedule. The 
Superior Court affirmed the order of the Board that the plaintiff return 
to his patient the amount of his fee in excess of that permitted by the 
fee schedule for a "service benefit member," which this patient was by 
definition, under a group Blue Shield agreement with Harvard Uni-
versity, the patient's employer. The plaintiff appealed this decision 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The provisions of its agreement with Blue Shield obligated Harvard 
to pay to Blue Shield on a monthly basis 108 percent of the amounts 
paid by Blue Shield to participating physicians for services rendered to 
Harvard's covered employees. This agreement, which became effec-
tive July 1, 1960, together with a copy of the subscriber's certificate, 
was filed with the Division of Insurance on July 20, 1960, in accordance 
with the statutory requirement.a No schedule of the charges made 
by Harvard to the employee-subscribers was filed, nor does it appear 
from the opinion of the Court what these charges were. The plain-
tiff physician contended that the failure to file a schedule of these 
charges was a failure to comply with the statute, invalidating the 
agreement between Blue Shield and Harvard, and that, as a conse-
quence, the plaintiff was not a participating physician in respect to 
Harvard employees. The Court rejected this argument, holding that 
the dominant purpose of the statute was to regulate the operations of 
a nonprofit medical service corporation, not to regulate ~he operations 
of an employer who makes an agreement with it to furnish group medi-
cal service benefits. The Court at least inferred that there was not 
literal compliance with the statutory filing requirement, but observed 
that literal compliance would not satisfy the statutory purpose, since 
the rates charged to the subscribers do not include the contribution 
made on the employee's behalf by the employer. 
In the view of the Court, the requirement that the rates charged by 
Blue Shield for the services of its participating physicians be filed with 
the Commissioner of Insurance, in the case of group agreements, is met 
of insurance and consisting of the commissioner or a person designated by him, 
the chairman of the board of registration in medicine or any person designated by 
him, and the attorney general or a person designated by him, for its decision with 
res~ct thereto. All decisions and orders of the board . . . may be revised as 
justice and equity may require upon a petition in equity filed ... in the superior 
court ... by any party aggrieved by such decision or order." 
3Id. §4, provides in part as follows: "Any agreement between a medical service 
corporation and a group of five or more persons or with the employer, employers 
or other representatives of such group ... shall be considered a group medical 
service agreement. 
"Under such a group medical service agreement, subscription certificates and 
the rates charged by the corporation shall be filed with the commissioner within 
thirty days after their effective date, and shall be subject to subsequent disapproval 
by the commissioner if he finds that the benefits provided therein are unreasonable 
in relation to the rate charged. or that the rates charged are excessive, inadequate 
or unfairly discriminatory." 
7
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by filing the over-all rates charged to the employer of the subscribers, 
and such a filing is adequate compliance with the statute. The Court 
also agreed with the Board's finding that the filing made in this case 
came within the classifications of risks permitted by the statute4 and 
agreed that the charge made by Blue Shield to group subscribers may 
be a fixed charge, but may also be a charge which is not exactly 
determinable in amount until some time after the expiration of 
coverage. 
§17.8. Nonprofit service plans: Subscribers over age sixty-five. 
On May 21, 1964, the House of Representatives adopted an order 
requesting the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court on whether a bill 
that would require nonprofit hospital service plans (Blue Cross) and 
nonprofit medical service plans (Blue Shield) to afford persons over age 
sixty-five premium rates no higher than those charged group subscribers 
would violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution 
or Article X of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Massa-
chusetts if the same obligation was not imposed upon all other hospital 
and medical service plans offered in the Commonwealth. The Court, 
noting a lack of clarity of intent in the proposed statutory language, a 
paucity of factual information upon which to examine the basis for 
the distinction made, and the narrowness of the constitutional inquiry 
propounded, stated! that it was unable to point to anything in the 
bill that would render it repugnant to the constitutional provisions 
specified. It did suggest, however, that some question might have 
been raised concerning the reasonableness of singling out as benefi-
ciaries persons over sixty-five and of imposing the burden of higher 
compensating premium rates upon other subscribers. In the circum-
stances, the Court advised that it would reconsider the question, un-
affected by this opinion, if litigation should arise following enactment 
of the proposed legislation. 
§17.9. Policy insuring agreements: Defense, settlement, supplemen-
tary payments. The question of an insurer's liability to pay an 
insured's counsel fees when a declaration in tort is broad enough to 
state a cause of action within the coverage of a policy but has been so 
framed as to omit statement of a fact that would bring the loss within 
a policy exclusion was raised in Magoun v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
4 Although it does not appear to modify the statutory filing requirement, the 
Court Wi/.S constrained to point out that the filing in question was within the type 
of situa,tion contemplated by the fifth paragraph of G.L., c. 176B, §4: "Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to prohibit as unreasonable or unfairly dis-
criminatory the establishment of classifications or modifications of classifications of 
risks based upon size, ~xpense, management, individual experience, purpose, loca-
tion or dispersion of hazard or any other reasonable considerations, or to prohibit 
retrospective refunds. Acquisition costs in connection with the solicitation of sub-
scribers and costs of administration shall at all times be limited to such amounts 
as the commissioner shall approve." 
§17.8. ! Opinion of the Justices, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 199 N.E.2d 179, also 
noted in §11.6 supra. 
8
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CO.l The declaration alleged that the defendant "was engaged in the 
handling of a load of steel at the freight depot ... [and] so negligently 
and carelessly handled said load of steel that by reason thereof, the 
steel fell on" the decedent. The facts developed by Liberty'S investi-
gation prior to suit disclosed that at the time of the accident causing 
the death the defendant was engaged "in loading the steel joists onto 
trucks" on the premises of a railroad company. 
The policy in suit was a schedule general liability policy (manufac-
turers' and contractors' form) which bound Liberty Mutual to pay on 
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or death caused 
by accident and arising out of the insured's premises and all operations 
necessary or incidental thereto. This insuring agreement was subject 
to the standard loading and unloading exclusion, which recites that 
the policy "does not apply ... to the ... use, including loading or 
unloading, of ... automobiles while away from such premises or the 
ways immediately adjoining .... " The policy also contained the 
standard insuring agreement obligating the insurer to defend the in-
sured in an action for damages within the coverage of the policy.2 
The insurer, both before and after suit was filed, communicated to 
the insured its willingness to undertake the defense of the action under 
a reservation of its rights to disclaim liability under. the policy. The 
insured was unwilling to have the insurer represent him under the 
terms of the reservation and retained his own counsel. Thereafter, 
the insurer co-operated with the counsel retained by the insured in the 
defense of the tort action, which ultimately resulted in a judgment for 
the insured. The insured thereupon demanded reimbursement of 
counsel fees, which the insurer denied, contending that it should not 
be required to pay the insured's legal expenses in view of its offer to 
assume the defense of the tort action under a reservation of rights, 
the insured's refusal of that offer, and its surrender to the insured of 
control of the defense of that tort action. 
In Massachusetts, Salonen v. Paanenens firmly established the doc-
trine that no estoppel arises against an insurer by reason of its defense 
of an action against its insured after it has acquired information 
justifying a disclaimer when such defense is conducted under a reserva-
tion of rights. The insurer is faced with a dilemma when it discovers 
a basis for disclaiming liability. If it continues to defend, 'it risks 
the loss of its right to disclaim. If it refuses to defend, it risks liability 
for breach of the covenant to defend. In Salon en the Court was care-
§17.9. 1346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964). 
2 This provision reads in part: "As respects the insurance afforded by the other 
terms of this policy the company shall: (a) defend any suit against the insured 
alleging such injury ... and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such 
suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but ..• the company may make such in-
vest!~ation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. 
S 320 Mass. 568, 71 N.E.2d 227 (1947). 
9
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ful, however, to point out that it was not holding that the insurer may 
reserve its rights to disclaim and at the same time insist upon retaining 
control of the defense.' And this was not the precise question reached 
in Magoun, since the plaintiff had no recovery and the insurer did 
not at any time insist upon retaining control of the defense. 
The case does raise the question, however, of the insurer's liability 
to pay the insured's legal expenses when, as here, there is a possible 
divergence of interests and the insurer has acquiesced in the insured's 
insistence upon retaining his own counsel and has co-operated in the 
successful defense of the action. In the view of the Court, the failure 
of the insurer to reach agreement with the insured regarding the cost 
of the defense, which the insurer was obligated to furnish, created an 
uncertainty that should be resolved against the insurer. While the 
case would seem to suggest that the insurer in these circumstances 
could avoid liability for such costs by making appropriate reservations, 
it is difficult to see how it could overcome the insured's refusal to 
consent to such reservations. 
B. GENERAL INSURANCE - LEGISLATION 
§17.10. Motor vehicle insurance: Merit rating. During the 1964 
SURVEY year the legislature once again responded to the recurring 
demand that merit rating of liability insurance be made available to 
Massachusetts motor vehicle owners. A bill filed on behalf of the 
Commissioner of Insurance would have amended the statute1 directing 
the Commissioner to establish risk classifications and premium rates for 
compulsory motor vehicle liability policies to include a provision that 
"the commissioner may establish further classifications of risks for 
accident-free drivers." Acts of 1964, Chapter 391, revised the Commis-
sioner's bill by amending the statute to require that the "commissioner 
shall, annually, ... fix and establish fair and reasonable classifications 
of risks, including classifications of risks based on accident involve-
ment .... " In addition to changing the permissive character of the 
Commissioner's bill, the enactment eliminated the "accident-free" 
emphasis of that bill and substituted the troublesome concept of 
"accident involvement." These significant changes made in one of 
the shortest bills introduced in the session reflect the difficulties that 
have been encountered over the years in successive efforts to develop a 
merit-rating plan that is at once politically attractive and actuarially 
sound. The very carefully constructed merit-rating provisions of 
the ill-fated Highway Safety Act of 19532 were retained for less than 
six weeks after they became effective on January 1, 1956, as the General 
Court hastily responded to the complaints of those motor vehicle 
owners who were subjected to premium surcharging.s It is actuarially 
§17.10. 1 G.L., c. 175, §1l3B. 
2 Id., c. 9OA, added by Acts of 1953, c. 570, effective June 30, 1953. 
S Acts of 1956, c. 51, repealing G.L., c. 9OA, §§ 12-15, and 17, and amending §16, 
effective Feb. 8, 1956; Acts of 1956, c. 201, repealing G.L., c. 9OA, §ll, effective 
Mar. 15, 1956; see 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.8. 
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impossible to give a very large number of accident-free drivers a mean-
ingful reduction in insurance premiums without simultaneously im-
posing on the accident-involved drivers substantially increased insur-
ance premiums. Moreover, there does not seem to be an effective way 
to persuade the driver who does not receive the reduced premiums re-
served for the accident-free driver that he is not being surcharged for 
his accident involvement. It is, of course, the imposition of surcharges 
that makes merit rating unpopular with those who do have accidents. 
This difficulty is further compounded by the apparent unwillingness of 
those who are not insurance professionals to accept the perfectly sound 
underwriting concept of accident involvement as a basis for modifying 
insurance premiums, and their insistence that liability for an accident 
must be finally established in order to impose on a driver a merit-rating 
surcharge or to deny him a merit-rating credit. Unhappily, it is al-
most a certainty that such an arrangement can only be expected to 
increase the volume of motor vehicle tort litigation and to inhibit the 
development of any significant premium reduction for "accident-free" 
drivers. 
Following the enactment of this statutory change, a number of 
serious questions concerning its implementation by the Commissioner 
of Insurance arose almost at once. Perhaps the most troublesome of 
these were whether losses other than compulsory insurance losses,4 or 
accidents occurring prior to the effective date of the enactment were to 
be taken into account in fixing the merit-rating classifications. These 
questions were in effect avoided by accomplishing the implementation 
of the statute in a series of steps. By order of the Commissioner, the 
experience period hereafter for each calendar year of coverage will be 
the twelve-month period beginning on September 1 of the second pre-
ceding calendar year, with the first such period to begin on September 
1, 1964, thus excluding losses occurring prior to the statutory change. 
"Accident-free" and "accident-involved" classifications will be estab-
lished for calendar year 1965 but with no differences in premiums for 
such classifications because of accident experience. Not until calendar 
year 1966 will different premiums be established for these additional 
classifications. For the present, only compulsory insurance losses will 
be taken into account, but the Commissioner has disclosed an intention 
to file additional legislation that would authorize the inclusion of 
property damage, extraterritorial, and guest coverage as an integral 
part of the plan. 
The Commissioner has sought to resolve the problem of "accident 
involvement" by defining these words to mean involvement in "any 
accident which occurs during the experience period which results in 
bodily injury or death to a person or persons, as a consequence of 
which an amount has been paid as a loss or an amount is held as a 
4 Compulsory insurance losses are those paid or payable under a motor vehicle 
liability policy as defined in G.L., c. 90, §34A; excluded are guest and extraterritorial 
bodily injury liability losses, all property damage liability losses, and all physical 
damage losses. 
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reserve for a claim made under Coverage A only of a Massachusetts 
Statutory Motor Vehicle Policy (compulsory) covering a motor vehicle 
to which the plan applies." It would appear, however, that the 
Commissioner is not unaware of the potential difficulties inherent 
in using loss reserves as a basis for merit rating, since he has also dis-
closed an intention to establish a Board of Review within the Insur-
ance Department "to consider" the complaint of any motorist who may 
feel that an insurance company may have "unjustifiably" settled a 
claim against him. It is unclear what action, if any, could be taken 
by such a Board. Whether this effort at merit rating will prove to be 
more durable than past efforts, only time will tell. 
§17.11. Motor vehicle insurance: Compulsory coverage. Each year 
numerous bills are filed to extend the scope of compulsory insurance; 
the proposals this SURVEY year included bills to make mandatory 
property damage liability insurance, extraterritorial coverage, and 
bodily injury liability limits above the historical $5000/$10,000 
mInImUms. One relatively small extension was accomplished by Acts 
of 1964, Chapter 517,1 which broadened the compulsory coverage of 
accidents arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, con-
trol, or use of a motor vehicle "upon the ways of the commonwealth" 
to "upon the ways of the commonwealth or in any place therein to 
which the public has a right of access." While this new language 
seems destined to raise some new problems in determining the ques-
tion of "right of access" it does bring the compulsory coverage into 
shopping plazas, automobile service stations, drive-in theatres, and the 
like. It is a little difficult to understand the legislature's unwilling-
ness to adopt the bill as originally filed, in which form it would simply 
have made the entire extraterritorial coverage mandatory, unless lin-
gering constitutional misgivings remain. In any case, it may be 
expected that continued efforts will be made to broaden the compul-
sory coverage, and these efforts seem likely to succeed, either through 
modest step-by-step changes over a period of several years or through 
major legislation enacted in one year. 
§17.12. Motor vehicle insurance: Assigned risks. During the 1964 
SURVEY year a major effort was made to ease the problems confronting 
applicants for motor vehicle insurance who are obliged to use the 
facilities of the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Assigned Risk Plan, and 
to eliminate a number of questionable practices of some insurance 
brokers, practices which the Commissioner of Insurance has sought to 
curb by issuing a series of administrative orders. House Bill No. 923 
would have supplied the basic statutory change required to enable the 
insurance industry to make available to all motor vehicle registrants 
"immediate certification" on their registration applications that the 
mandatory insurance has been afforded with respect to the motor 
vehicle being registered. This immediate certification, under a plan 
§17.11. 1 Amending G.L., c. 90, §34A (defining "motor vehicle liability policy" 
and "motor vehicle liability bond"), and §34D (prescribing conditions for a cash 
deposit in lieu of a motor vehicle liability policy or bond). 
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devised by the industry, could be obtained from any insurance com-
pany or from the insurance company agent of the registrant's choice 
and it would be executed in the name of the assigned risk plan if the 
risk was not acceptable on a voluntary basis. Under such a plan the 
whole process of obtaining insurance under the assigned risk plan 
would be simplified and streamlined, both for the applicant and for 
the companies, all of which are obliged to assume a proportionate 
share of assigned risks. Despite the almost unanimous support of 
virtually all segments of the insurance industry, this legislation was 
referred to a special commission for further investigation and study.l. 
§17.13. Group health insurance. Acts of 1964, Chapter 236, 
amended the definition of general or blanket accident and health 
policies I to permit the issuance of such policies to a bank or group 
of banks to cover groups of persons who are debtors of such bank or 
group of banks up to the amount of the indebtedness. This legisla-
tion also authorizes the purchase of such group insurance by a bank 
or group of banks2 and the payment to any such bank or group of 
banks of a service charge reasonably related to the cost of administer-
ing the insurance.8 
§17.14. Policy conditions: Appraisal. In 1961 a new sectioni was 
added to the insurance law, requiring all motor vehicle physical 
damage insurance policies to contain in substance the statutory arbi-
tration provision for resolving a failure of an insured and an insur-
ance company to agree on the amount of a loss under such a policy. 
This statutory requirement was aimed at a small number of companies 
that were not using policies prepared in accordance with the Standard 
Provisions for Automobile Policies and which made no arbitration 
arrangements available to its policyholders. Acts of 1964, Chapter 
171,2 adds a further statutory requirement to discipline such noncon-
forming companies. By this enactment motor vehicle physical damage 
policies must contain a provision imposing upon the insured the 
duty to give notice to the company in the event of loss and to the 
police if the loss is by theft, and imposing upon the company 
the obligation to pay the amount of the loss within sixty days after 
the filing of proof of loss. Policies prepared in accordance with the 
standard provisions conform to this requirement because they contain 
in substance this newly required provision. 
§17.15. Insurance companies: Participating policies. A bill i filed 
during the 1963 session of the legislature at the request of the Com-
§17.l2. I Resolves of 1964, c. 87. 
§17.13. I G.L., c. 175, §llO. 
2 Id., c. 167, §56B. 
SId., c. 175, §§177, 184; and c. 167, §56B. 
§17.14. I G.L., c. 175, §191A, added by Acts of 1961, c. 92; see 1961 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §14.15. 
2Amending G.L., c. 175, §191A. 
§17.l5. I House Doc. No. 917 (1963). 
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missioner of Insurance proposed legislation to equalize the regulation 
of participating stock and mutual companies by subjecting stock com-
panies qualified to issue policies on a participating plan to the statu-
tory provisions regulating the payment of dividends by mutual com-
panies. The proposed legislation was specifically confined to work-
men's compensation insurance, however, and would have expanded 
only the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act relating to 
the dividends of mutual companies2 to encompass the payment of 
dividends by participating stock companies. Under existing law, 
dividends of participating stock companies are not subject to any of 
the regulatory provisions applicable to mutual companies, including 
not only those relating to workmen's compensation insurance, but 
also those specifically applicable to compulsory motor vehicle liability 
insurances and those applicable to all forms of casualty and property 
insurance generally.4 
The basic requirements of the statutory regulation of mutual com-
pany dividends call for a classification system based upon kinds of 
insurance5 and an equal rate of dividends, payable if any are declared, 
on all policies insuring risks in the same classification. The special 
provision concerning workmen's compensation insurance authorizes 
the further classification of this type of risk into groups distinguished 
by the nature of the employer's business and the degree of the liability 
of injury, and also the declaration of dividends in accordance with 
the experience in each of these classifications. The special provisions 
relating to compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance require the 
separate classification of such insurance and the declaration of divi-
dends only from earnings on this classification of business. The re-
quirement of an equal rate of dividend on all policies within a 
dividend classification has been applied to all special classifications 
authorized or required by the workmen's compensation and compul-
sory motor vehicle liability insurance laws. 
In the absence of any specific statutory restriction, it would appear 
that stock companies authorized to issue policies on a participating 
plan can elect to write some policies on a participating basis and others 
on a nonparticipating basis, and can pick and choose on a risk-by-risk 
basis which of its policyholders will be given the advantage of a 
participating dividend. It would also seem that such a company 
would have no obligation to declare an equal rate of dividend to all 
policyholders to whom it had issued participating policies. In these 
circumstances, unless it can somehow be shown that the statutory 
prohibition against unfair or deceptive trade practices6 requires other-
2 G.L., c. 152, §53. 
8 Id., c. 175, §1l3B. 
4Id. §80. 
Ii Id. §47, defines the kinds of insurance that companies may be authorized to 
write in Massachusetts. 
6 Id., c. 176D, prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices in the business of insurance. 
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wise, these companies can, for competitive or other reasons, engage 
in pricing practices that may be unfairly discriminatory, or that, in 
any event, may not be used by the mutual companies. That com-
petitive pressures of this kind are developing seems clear from the 
adoption in recent months by some stock companies of participating 
sliding scale dividend plans based upon loss experience and modifica-
tions of commission levels. 
The Commissioner's original bill was returned to the Division of 
Insurance7 for further study, with directions to report back before 
June 3, 1964, with legislative recommendations. The Commissioner's 
reportS recommended enactment of a bill very similar to that originally 
filed, with the addition of a specific provision relating to assigned 
risks. The measure was passed by the Senate but was rejected by 
the House in the closing hours of the legislative session. Thus 
"equality of regulation" was postponed for at least one additional 
year. 
§17.16. Insurance premium finance agencies. Acts of 1964, Chap-
ter 727,1 adds to the General Laws a new chapter subjecting premium 
finance agencies to detailed regulation under the supervision of the 
Commissioner of Banks. The new law requires any person seeking 
to engage in the business of financing insurance premiums to pay an 
initial one hundred dollar inspection fee and an annual three hundred 
dollar license fee for each office maintained. If application for 
licensing three or more offices is made at one time, the inspection fee 
is limited to three hundred dollars. Exempted from the provisions 
of this law are insurance agents and brokers who have no more than 
fifteen thousand dollars in outstanding premium balances at anyone 
time, insurance premiums financed at no more than six dollars per 
one hundred dollars per annum, insurance charges included in in-
stallment sales of property, goods, or services, and policies of life, 
endowment, and retirement income insurance or annuity contracts. 
§17.17. Insurance companies. Acts of 1964, Chapter 31, author-
izes insurance companies to defer up to 12Y2 percent, or such larger 
percentage as may be approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, 
of the annual salary of an officer or employee beyond the three-year 
statutory limit formerly imposed1 upon salary agreements. 
Acts of 1964, Chapter 154, amends the statutory provision requiring 
every insurance company to conduct business only in its corporate 
name and to display only that name on its policies and contracts2 to 
permit two or more insurers under a common management and doing 
business as an insurance company group, with the approval of the 
Commissioner of Insurance, to display on its policies the name of the 
7 Resolves of 1964, c. 76. 
S House Doc. No. 3623 (1964). 
§17.16. 1 Adding G.L., c. 255C. 
§17.l7. 1 G.L., c. 175, §35. 
2Id. §18. 
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company group or the names of the individual members of the group. 
provided that the individual policies as issued clearly indicate the 
specific company assuming the risk. When identical policy forms 
are used by the individual companies, the company group can pro-
mote efficiency and economy of operation by the use of policies pre-
pared in the manner authorized by this statute. 
c. LIFE INSURANCE 
§17.18. Insurer's defense of misrepresentation in application: 
Alcoholism. A life insurance policy, being a contract, is voidable 
within its contestable period for misrepresentations leading to its 
issuance. Under Massachusetts lawl the question of whether a mis-
representation will be grounds for avoidance depends upon whether 
it was made with actual intent to deceive or whether the matter 
misrepresented increased the risk of loss. Whether these situations 
exist is most often for the jury to decide. But in some instances, 
once the fact of misrepresentation has been established, it is held that 
as a matter of law the matter misrepresented increased the risk of loss.2 
That this is the case when the matter misrepresented is a history of 
alcoholism was reaffirmed in The Merchants National Bank of New-
buryport v. New York Life Insurance Co.s The insured in that case 
had represented in his application for a policy in 1959 that he had 
never used alcoholic beverages to excess nor been treated for alco-
holism. In fact, however, he had reported excessive drinking to a 
doctor in 1957, and after the policy had been issued he stated to a 
hospital that he had consumed one to two fifths of alcohol each day 
from early 1956 until November, 1958, and that thereafter "he was 
sober seventy-five percent of the time." Other representations, as to 
hospitalization, illness, and consultation of physicians, and their 
falsity, were likewise established by answers to a demand by the 
defendant company under General Laws, Chapter 231, Section 69, 
for admission of facts. A directed verdict for the defendant was held 
by the Supreme Judicial Court to be correct, since the misrepresenta-
tions concerning the use of alcohol materially increased the risk as 
a matter of law.4 
Because the insurance contract apparently had been made in Cali-
fornia, where the insured had been domiciled, the Court also con-
sidered the law of that state and held that the same result would be 
reached in view of all the various admitted misrepresentations. 
§17.19. Variable annuities. In 1960 the General Court amended 
General Laws, Chapter 175, by inserting Section 132F.l It thereby 
§17.l8. 1 C.L., c. 175, §186. 
2 See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.3. 
31964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 203, 196 N.E.2d 201. 
4 Rainger v. Boston Mutual Life Assn., 167 Mass. 109, 44 N.E. 1088 (1896). See 
also Schiller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 169, 3 N.E.2d 384 (1936). 
§17.l9. 1 See 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.l5. 
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permitted freer investment in common stocks and equities of funds 
received by life insurance companies under policies and contracts 
issued in connection with pension or profit sharing plans. It allowed 
such "pension contracts" to reflect to a degree, beyond fixed and 
guaranteed amounts of return, the earnings (or losses) from these less 
rigidly conservative investments. However, such contracts are still 
required to contain a basic standard annuity, guaranteed as to both 
amount and duration, and are not true variable annuity contracts. 
The statute was designed to achieve a balance between the security-
oriented standard annuity concept and the capital-appreciation-seeking 
variable annuity. By Chapter 848 of the Acts of 1963, the legislature 
went even further by authorizing the making of contracts for the pay-
ment of true variable annuities. Such contracts may be made by 
variable annuity insurance companies organized for that purpose and 
may, subject to the usual approval of the form thereof by the Com-
missioner of Insurance, be written on an individual or group basis. 
They will provide for the purchase of a fixed number of annuity 
units and for the payment of annuity benefits varying in amount, 
entirely reflecting the investment results of a portfolio of investments 
in which the money received by the company in connection with such 
contracts has been deposited. Assets set aside for variable annuity 
contracts may (unlike most of the basic assets of life insurance com-
panies) be invested wholly or partly in common stocks or other 
equities, subject to limitations on the amounts to be invested in, or 
loaned upon, the common stocks or shares of anyone institution. 
The unit value of the variable annuity contract is to be determined 
semiannually and made known to the annuitant and the Commis-
sioner. In order that this may be done, any common stock purchased 
for variable annuity contracts must be one listed or admitted to trading 
in a securities exchange located in the United States or Canada, or 
publicly held and traded in the "over the counter market" as defined 
by the Commissioner and for which market quotations have been 
available. Sale or negotiation of variable annuity contracts, and the 
contracts themselves, are subject not only to insurance laws but also 
to the Sale of Securities Act.2 Life insurance companies may not only 
invest in the stock of variable annuity companies, but in such invest-
ments they are not subject to the usual limitation that no life company 
may hold more than 10 percent of the stock of anyone corporation. 
§17.20. Insurance companies: Deferred compensation of officers, 
trustees, or employees. Insurance companies have formerly been for-
bidden by General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 35, to make any de-
ferred compensation agreements with any of their officers, trustees, 
or employees extending beyond three years from the date of the 
agreement. This law has been amended by Acts of 1964, Chapter 
31, to allow up to 12Y2 percent of the annual compensation to be 
deferred beyond the three-year period, and an even larger percentage 
may be deferred if the Commissioner of Insurance approves. 
2 G.L., c. 110A. 
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§17.21. Insurance companies: Use of insurance group name. Acts 
of 1964, Chapter 154, amends General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 18, 
so as to allow, subject to approval by the Commissioner of Insurance, 
two or more insurers under a common management, representing 
themselves as an insurance company group or similar insurance trade 
designation, to head their policies or contracts with either the group 
name or trade designation or with the names of the individual mem-
bers of the group. However, the company assuming the insurance 
must be specifically identified. 
§17.22. Nonlapsation for failure to pay premiums during strike 
of collection agents. Acts of 1963, Chapter 796, provides that no 
life insurance policy, noncancellable disability insurance contract, 
hospital expense or hospital and surgical expense contract "now or 
hereafter in force in the commonwealth, premiums for which are 
normally collected by insurance agents employed by the insurer" shall 
terminate or lapse by reason of default in payment of any premium, 
installment, or interest on any policy loan payable to the insurer 
during the period its agents are on strike. The statute gives the 
premium payer a grace period of thirty-one days immediately follow-
ing the "authorized" termination of the strike in which to pay the 
premium, installment, or loan interest, during which time the policy 
or contract is to continue in full force and effect. Provision is made, 
in the event a claim arises during a strike or grace period, for deduc-
tion of the overdue premium or installment and interest thereon, and 
of the amount of any policy loan and interest, from the amount paya-
ble under the policy. 1 
§17.23. Tax lien: Interests in endowment policies. In United 
States v. Brody,1 discussed in the 1963 ANNUAL SURVEY,2 the Federal 
District Court for Massachusetts decreed the foreclosure of a tax lien 
on the taxpayer's interest in two endowment policies, despite the facts 
that the policies had not been formally surrendered and were not 
physically within the court's jurisdiction and that the taxpayer neither 
had been personally served nor had appeared in the foreclosure suit. 
Upon appeal by the insurer, this action has been upheld by the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of u.s. v. United States.s The carefully considered opinion by Judge 
Aldrich expresses disagreement, however, with some of the reasoning 
of the district court. 
The defaulting taxpayer was the endowment beneficiary under each 
policy, and the government had been designated as the revocable bene-
ficiary of the death benefits payable if the taxpayer died before the 
policies matured. At maturity the endowment sum was to become 
§17.22. 1 The statute has been attacked before the Supreme Judicial Court as 
unconstitutional in its application to companies. A decision is expected during the 
1965 SURVEY year. 
§17.211. 12111 F. Supp. 905 (D. Mass. 19611). 
21963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.14. 
82111 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1964). 
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payable upon surrender of the policies. The policies also provided 
that before maturity the taxpayer could surrender them for cash or 
borrow against them up to their respective loan values. One of the 
policies had matured before the government filed notice of lien.4 
The other had been fully paid up in advance but had not yet matured 
at the time action was commenced5 to enforce the lien. The action 
was brought in the District of Massachusetts, although it was not 
claimed that the taxpayer (who had absconded) was then domiciled 
here. Equitable, a New York corporation, was doing business in 
Massachusetts. Service on the taxpayer was made only by publica-
tion.6 
The insurer pressed on appeal the contention that the taxpayer, 
an indispensable party,7 had been ineffectively served by publication, 
and that in his absence it was not liable upon the policies unless they 
were physically surrendered. The district court had rejected the con-
tention that physical surrender of the policies was a condition prece-
dent to the insurer's liability, saying that firstS and third9 circuit cases 
so holding had been "discredited" sub silencio by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Bess.to The court of appeals 
agreed that such surrender is not necessary here, but defended the 
Massachusetts Mutual and Penn Mutual decisions. 
The Massachusetts Mutual case was not brought to reach property 
of the insured, but rather to enforce a penalty against the insurer 
for its failure to honor the government's demand that property of 
the insured in its possession be paid over to the government. Conse-
quently neither the insured nor his beneficiary appeared before the 
court in that case. Since the policy in that case was unmatured, it 
might have had a real value to the insured or his beneficiary far 
greater than its cash surrender value, which is actually its minimum 
4 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §6321, which provides for such a lien "upon all 
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to" the delin· 
quent taxpayer. 
5 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §7403: "(a) In any case where there has been a 
refusal or neglect to pay any tax ... a civil action [may be filed] ... to enforce 
the lien of the United States under this title with respect to such tax ... or to 
subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any 
right, title or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability. 
"(b) All persons ... claiming any interest in the property involved in such 
action shall be made parties thereto." 
6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1655 (1958), which provides: "In an action in a district 
court to enforce any lien upon ... real or personal property within the district, 
where any defendant cannot be served within the State ... the court may order 
the absent defendant to appear or plead. . . . 
"Such order shall be served on the absent defendant personally if practicable. 
• .. Where personal service is not practicable, the order shall be published .... 
"Any defendant not so personally notified may, at any time within one year 
after final judgment, enter his appearance, and thereupon the court shall set aside 
the judgment and permit such defendant to plead .... " 
7 See Section 7403(b), quoted in note 5 supra. 
8 United States v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 127 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1942). 
9 United States v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1942). 
10357 U.S. 51, 78 Sup. Ct. 1054, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1135 (1958). 
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worth. This would have been the case if the death of the insured 
(at which time the full face value would have been payable) had been 
imminent while the cash surrender value was low. Therefore, the 
right to convert the insurer's primary obligation, payment of the face 
amount to the beneficiary upon the insured's death, into an obligation 
to pay a lesser cash value to the insured upon surrender of the policy, 
was a right of substance. In some circumstances a court might order 
the insured to exercise this right, but, as has been stated, he was not 
before the court in Massachusetts Mutual to be subject to such an 
order, nor was his beneficiary present so as to be bound by any 
decision cutting off such rights as she had. The insurer, after paying 
the government a penalty measured by the value of the policy, might 
later have been obliged to pay the actual proceeds of the policy to 
the insured or his beneficiary. 
The court in Equitable stated that the fully matured policy was 
absolutely owing, except for whatever effect should be given to the 
surrender requirement, and held that the special circumstances of the 
Massachusetts Mutual case did not apply here. Physical surrender of 
the policy, said the court, was a mere housekeeping matter that would 
enable the insurer to tidy up its affairs but the lack of which could 
not by itself prevent the government from reaching the proceeds of 
the policy. The court analogized the situation to the requirement 
of presentation of a bankbook in order to obtain funds on deposit. 
It distinguished it from Massachusetts Mutual, where physical sur-
render of the unmatured policy would symbolize an election by the 
insured to terminate the insurer's obligation to pay the beneficiary 
the death benefit when due, and to accept in lieu of this the sub-
stantially different performance of payment of the cash surrender 
value to the insured. 
Having thus decided with respect to the matured policy that its 
physical surrender was not an essential prerequisite to invoking the 
obligation to pay the endowment proceeds, the court proceeded to 
the question of whether the government could reach those proceeds. 
It held that the obligation was sufficient to support a tax lien under 
Section 6321 and an action to enforce it under Section 7403 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and decided that any chose of sufficient 
vitality to support a lien cognizable under Section 7403 must equally 
qualify as property under Section 1655 of Title 28,11 even though the 
principal use of the latter section has been in connection with liens 
upon tangible property. The "property," i.e., the insurer's obliga-
tion, was apparently considered "within the district," since personal 
jurisdiction over the insurer had been obtained here (as it probably 
could have been obtained in any district of the United States) and in 
compliance with Section 1655, notice had been given sufficient to meet 
the,requirements of due process of law. 
The court went on to discuss the unmatured policy in suit and 
held that with respect to that policy also the government had a lien 
11 28 U.S.C. §1655 (1962), quoted in part in note 6 supra. 
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that was enforceable in this action. Massachusetts Mutual, it said, 
held only that the insurer there was not "in possession" of property 
or rights to property of the insured so as to be subject to a penalty for 
failure to pay it over to the government. That is, no exercise of 
the right to terminate the insurer's primary obligation by requesting 
cash surrender value had been made by, or binding, the insured so 
as to reduce the insurer's obligation to a simple debt, like a bank 
deposit "in possession." But Massachusetts Mutual did not hold that 
the government did not have a lien against the policy contract; rather 
it assumed that it did have such a lien. Likewise, said the court, there 
was a lien against the unmatured policy in this case. Moreover, it 
stated, the government this time had proceeded properly to enforce 
its lien, joining the insured, who was thus afforded the opportunity 
to protect his interests in the policy while the insurer was protected 
against double liability.12 
Finally the court adverted to the problems which might arise when 
the publication provisions of Section 1655 of Tide 28 of the United 
States Code are applied to insurance policies. That section18 allows a 
defendant who is not personally notified of an action with respect 
to property in which he claims an interest to have the judgment set 
aside within one year and to plead. In the case of foreclosure of a 
lien on a simple debt, the problem posed by this provision is not 
acute. Money has changed hands and is presumably retrievable. 
But if the judgment of the court was that a policy be surrendered 
for its cash value, possibilities of more serious inequities arise. If the 
judgment is vacated is the policy to be revived? In justice to the 
insured, perhaps it should be. On the other hand, such revival of 
surrendered policies would leave insurers, through no fault on their 
part, open to elections to revive policies made because, since the time 
of the original judgment, the insured had suffered a loss exceeding the 
surrender value of the policy. That is, insurers may be subjected to 
increased claims because of an opportunity given to policy owners 
to make elections based upon hindsight. The court in Equitable 
suggested that the problem can be avoided if original judgments do 
not decree outright surrender of policies but rather the taking of loans 
thereon to the full extent of the policy value, save enough to pay 
interest (and thus keep the policies in force) for a year after judgment. 
12 The court apparently considered that obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction over 
the unmatured policy obligations, with notice to the insured, was sufficient joining 
of the insured to enable the policy chose to be dealt with as though there were 
in personam jurisdiction over the insured making him amenable to judicial orders 
that he apply for cash or loan values. The unmatured policy obligations are fluid 
and indefinite, in that by the policy's terms the insured can elect among alternative 
performances and no particular sum can be said to be due until he either does 
so or dies without having done so, or the policy matures. Nevertheless, the court 
considered that they were sufficiently "property" to support a lien and to give 
quasi in rem jurisdiction so as to bind the insured by the court's order electing 
among the various potential obligations of the insurer. 
18 Section 1655, note 6 supra. 
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